RE: gtg witness update, upcoming changes in HBD APR

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RE: gtg witness update, upcoming changes in HBD APR

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dalz in Blockchain Wizardry • 3 years ago

I don't know what would be the right APR, and probably nobody does, we all play the guessing game here, as for the most thing in life :)

But I don't think constantly tinkering parameters is a good thing, and the overall uncertainty that we have with this parameter. Can we try and propose some type of rules and mechanics that will give predictability to the HBD APR and how it is determined, and have this set in code?

At the end the HBD APR is secondary when it comes to the health of HBD and HIVE, the haircut rule is the ultimate protection and the ruler of the system.

3 years ago in Blockchain Wizardry by dalz

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trostparadox 3 years ago

Personally, I think this sort of decision needs to stay in the hands of witnesses, where it is public and transparent.

The witnesses answer directly to the community, via stake-weighted voting.

This is exactly as it should be, imho.

If @gtg lowers the APY and enough stakeholders unvote him as witness, he will reconsider.

Also, keeping important parameters at the witness level allows extremely quick responses to attacks and other potential problems.

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empoderat 3 years ago (edited)

Like a proposal that never expires and is updated every month or two and has the following options:

Up
Keep
Down

If the up wins, increase the apr to 0.5-1%, If the Keep wins, just let it untouched, and if the Down wins reduce the apr -0.5-1%.

And some mechanism so that you can 'keep' your vote without having to renew it after each reset. But that after a year it expires and you have to vote again manually (in case of lost keys, death, etc).

This way the APR would be predictable within a timeframe of 6-12 months more or less, and it would be ideal to increase it as we 'feel' the peak of the bull market approaches to incentivize the people to sell before the inevitable crash and reduce it as we bottom out to incentivize people to move to HP.

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dalz 3 years ago (edited)

As I see it, we have two options with a dynamic APR:

time lockups (bonds?), when the APR is based on the period you are willing to lock it (3% for a month, 5% for two, 10% for a year, 20% for two...or similar)
semidinamic APR, where we se the APR for a period (month or quartal) based on the hive debt .... because the debt and the haircut is the ultimate ruler of the system, example (debt is bellow 10%, we set a 20% APR) debt between 10% and 20%, a 10% APR, debt above 20%, 0% APR ... this again as an example numbers), we can even have a slider from 0% to 20% for each change in the debt.

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trostparadox 3 years ago

If we have time-specific lock-up vaults, then no investor will ever complain about changing APYs, because it's not changing for their already-committed investments.

When I lock up money in a CD, I don’t care if the bank cuts interest rates on new CDs, at least not until mine matures.

That's the way HBD APY should operate.

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empoderat 3 years ago

A semidinamic apr sounds good, as long as it doesn't make the code less secure, of course.

Anyway, let's see how the HBD debate ends

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dalz 3 years ago

Anyway, let's see how the HBD debate ends

All for debate ... on another note, some might argue that going in the opposite directions with the HBD APR, from the second point I described above in the semidinamic case is actually better .... example, high debt = high HBD APR, not the opposite, this to stimulate more funds into the ecosystem ... its a whole game theory and monetary policy that we are talking about :)

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